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We estimate real wage cyclicality in the period compressed between 1987 and 2013
using a large administrative dataset of workers in Spain. Real wages are weakly
procyclical in Spain and focusing on differences in different phases of the business
cycle, we find that differences across expansions and recessions are significant, with
an even lower real wage cyclicality in recessions. Furthermore, higher levels of
unemployment do not translate into additional real wages adjustments when the
economy is contracting, while lower levels of unemployment during expansions
have incremental effects on wage elasticity. This general result holds after
accounting for differences in tenure, type of contract and age categories.
Nevertheless, wages of newly-hired workers are the most sensitive to the business
cycle and exhibit the lowest asymmetric pattern between expansions and recessions.
At the other end, wages of workers with more than six years of tenure can be
characterized as the most protected against economic downturns. The same is true
for fixed-term vs. permanent workers, as well as for young vs. older workers.
JEL classification: e32, j31
Keywords: Wage cyclicality; Downward wage rigidity; Social security data1 Introduction
Wage reaction to the crisis initiated in 2008 is in the core of the economic and polit-
ical debate. This is especially so in Euro Area countries like Spain, where unemploy-
ment has more than tripled since 2008, while wages, at least in the initial phase of the
crisis, failed to react to the strong deterioration of the labor market, and a rise in real
wages was observed1.
However, the empirical literature on wage responsiveness to the economic cycle
tends to be inconclusive. Studies based on aggregate data tend to fail in finding a pro-
cyclical pattern in real wages for most countries, since changes in the composition of
the work force induce a countercyclical bias in the aggregate real wage (Mitchell et al.
1985, Solon et al. 1994, for instance). On the other hand, studies based on micro
data show a much clearer procyclical behavior of real wages (Shin 1994 and Devereux
2001, for instance). In addition, when worker’s heterogeneity is taken into account,
the procyclical pattern that wages exhibit tends to be more pronounced for newly-
hired employees, while wages of incumbent workers are found to be more rigid
(Carneiro et al. 2012, for instance). In the case of Spain, mostly due to the absence of
individual databases to properly estimate wage elasticity to labor market conditions,2015 Font et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
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Security Registers information to estimate wage elasticity to unemployment variation con-
trolling for individual heterogeneity. In his study, De la Roca finds weak procyclicality of
real wages in Spain, estimating that a one percentage point decline in the unemployment
rate increases real wages by 0.4%. This estimate is considerably lower than the ones
estimated for developed countries. In Pissarides (2009), for instance, elasticities are shown
to be higher than 1 in most studies covering US and some European labor markets.
In this paper, we follow a similar approach to De la Roca (2014), although we focus
on how wage cyclicality varies during the different phases of the business cycle. Theor-
etically, there are multiple reasons to expect an asymmetric response of wages to the
prevailing economic conditions, downward adjustments being much more difficult in
the presence of nominal and/or real downward wage rigidities, which are extensively
documented in the literature (Dickens et al. 2007). However, empirical evidence of
differences along the business cycle is neither abundant nor conclusive. For instance,
Cervini et al. (2013), using BHPS data for UK find that wage cyclicality is considerably
higher in economic recessions, and Martins (1997) finds similar results for Portugal. On
the contrary, Shin and Shin (2008), for the US, finds the opposite result, that is, wage
cyclicality is higher during expansionary periods. As far as we are aware, we present the
first empirical results regarding the Spanish labor market in this respect.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we provide a brief descrip-
tion of the dataset. Section 3 discusses the methodology implemented. Section 4 pre-
sents our estimated results. Final remarks are then presented in Section 5.
2 Dataset
In this study, we make use of Spain’s Social Security Administrative Labor Records
(Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales, MCVL hereinafter), which records the employ-
ment histories of a 4% non-stratified random sample of workers registered in the social
security system at some point between 2005 and 2013. For these workers, the MCVL
records all labor market transitions and job characteristics since 1980 or since first ap-
pearance in the social security system. The high frequency of our data2 allows us to
properly track labor market transitions, many of which would go unnoticed in lower
frequency datasets. Altogether, with the reliability of the information provided3, the
MCVL is a desirable longitudinal dataset to study wage responses to the cycle from a
microeconomic point of view.
To estimate wage cyclicality, we focus on the evolution of wages of salaried workers
in the private sector and exclude therefore self-employment and public administration
employees. Our wage variable records daily real wages in 2011 prices4 for those
workers that reported at least seven days of fulltime work in a given month. In this
dataset, wages are proxied by the Social Security contribution base. For most workers,
this is exactly equal to the earned wage. However, the existence of an upper bound in
the Social Security contribution base makes it impossible to know the exact wage for
the top part of the distribution. Hence, salaries are right-censored for some individuals.
We present estimates of the cyclicality excluding right-censored wages, but our results
are not affected if we include them in the dataset5.
To account for differences of wage response among different job tenure categories,
we construct a variable that reflects worker’s tenure by accumulating the days worked
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an employment to employment transition (switches firms). The former is classified as
newly-hired, and the latter as a job mover. A worker will either be recorded as newly-
hired or as a job mover within the first year in the firm. After that first year, our job
tenure categories comprise 1-2 years of work in the firm, 2–4 years, 4–6 years, and 6
or more years6. Given the high frequency of our data, it is possible to observe multiple
transitions from employment to unemployment in a given calendar year by a single
worker within the same firm. In this case, we will maintain the worker’s accumulated
experience as long as the worker’s separation from the firm does not expand beyond
11 months and as long as the worker does not switch firms before returning. If the
worker either switches firms or returns after 12 months or later, her accumulated
working experience in the firm resets to zero. Table 1 presents main characteristics of
our database, including more than 12 million observations on a monthly basis from
19877 to 2013 for some 163,000 workers. As it can be seen in this Table, the compos-
ition of the workforce across tenure categories shows around one quarter of workers in
the group of higher tenure (more than 6 years), while around 30% of workers are either
newly-hired or job movers.3 Methodology
The empirical model we use to analyze real wage cyclicality is a monthly level wage
equation with individual fixed effects. The introduction of workers fixed effects is
needed to address the workforce composition bias that originates along the different
phases of the business cycle (Solon et al. 1994). Most commonly, previous studies have
estimated a first differences wage regression model to address such composition bias
(Solon et al. 1994, Shin 1994, Devereux 2001). However, since we also want to estimateTable 1 Distribution of observations (a)
Recession Expansion Expansion Recesion
Total Unemp. High Unemp. High Unemp. Low Unemp. Low
(1) (2) (3) (4)
New hires 17.7 13.7 20.4 18.8 15.4
Job movers 13.1 8.2 11.4 16.3 11.0
Tenure 1-2 14.3 11.6 13.9 15.4 15.4
Tenure 2-4 17.6 18.2 15.5 17.7 19.8
Tenure 4-6 10.9 13.8 9.9 10.1 11.0
Tenure 6+ 26.4 34.4 28.9 21.7 27.5
Permanent 68. 78.6 70.6 62.9 74.2
Fixed-term 31.1 21.4 29.4 37.1 25.8
16-29 27.6 18.2 32.3 30.6 24.3
30-45 46.8 51.1 44.7 45.3 49.0
45+ 25.6 30.7 23.0 24.1 26.8
Number of observations
(First stage)
12,473,369 2,716,514 2,340,325 6,203,384 1,213,146
Number of individuals
(First stage)
163,447 99,295 76,317 138,472 94,739
(a) Calculated from a 20% random sample of the MCVL.
Share in sample (%).
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we make use of a wage equation in levels8. Our model’s baseline specification is
lnωim ¼ αi þ Ximβþ ζ0Ut−4 þ γ0mþ γ1m2 þ eim; ð1Þ
where ωim is the real daily earnings of individual i in month m, Xim is a vector of time-
varying individual and job type characteristics that include the age, the square of the
age, the worker’s job tenure category, the type of contract, a proxy for education (the
worker’s social security contribution group), and sector dummies. In addition, a linear
time trend m and its square are included. Ut − 4 is our cycle variable: The level of the
aggregated unemployment rate experienced by the economy in quarter t  49. Finally,
eim is a zero mean random term with constant variance.
Since all workers in month m are exposed to the same level of unemployment, the
standard error of the coefficient of interest ζ0 would be underestimated in the presence
of time-specific errors (Moulton 1986). As in De la Roca (2014), we follow Solon et al.
(1994) and Devereux (2001), adopting a two-step estimation procedure to overcome
this problem. Our new specification is described in the following equations:
lnωim ¼ αi þ Ximβþ
XT
t¼1
κtDt þ εim ð2Þ
κ_t ¼ μUt−4 þ ∂1t þ ∂2t2 þ
X4
t¼1
φtqt þ υit ð3Þ
Equation 2 incorporates a set of dummy variables Dt that reflect year-quarter combi-
nations10. The estimated coefficients κ_t capture variations in wages that are free from
observed characteristics and time-invariant unobserved individual heterogeneity. These
coefficients are then regressed against the unemployment rate, a linear time trend and
its square, and seasonal dummies (equation 3). The standard error of the semi-
elasticity of real wages to the unemployment rate μ, is now free from the grouped or
aggregated bias present in equation (1). As our cyclical variable is the level of the
unemployment rate, a negative estimate value of μ would imply that real wages are
procyclical, while counter-cyclicality of wages would be indicated by a positive value.
Insofar as we are interested in tracking down asymmetries along the business cycle, we
divide periods in which the economy is expanding (measured by positive employment
growth on a year-on-year basis) from those periods that the economy is contracting
(negative employment variation)11. Moreover, we further divide periods according to
the unemployment rate level being above or below the mean of the whole period
considered (1987–2013). This distinction allows us to check, for instance, whether if
downward pressure on wages when employment is falling is more intense after a long
recession–when unemployment is also high–or not. In principle, there are different
reasons to think this would be the case if, for example, a long recession has left the
economy with a large stock of unemployed workers posing extra pressure on wage
adjustment. However, the opposite could be true if, for example, the composition of the
unemployment rate is biased towards a high percentage of long-term unemployed
(possibly less attached to the labor market), resulting in a lower downward pres-
sure on wages.
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an economy in recession (employment is falling) and with a high level of unemploy-
ment (above the historical average); in the second phase, the employment starts to rise,
but the economy still experiences high levels of unemployment. The third phase would
consist of an expanding economy that enjoys low levels of unemployment; and finally,
in the fourth phase, the economy enters into recession but still maintains a low un-
employment rate.
In Figure 1, we present the actual evolution of employment growth and unemploy-
ment rate in Spain since 1987. The vertical axis is plotted at the average unemployment
rate across all the period (16.7%). Hence, the four sub-periods defined above corres-
pond to the four quarters in the graph. The natural movement in such a graph is in
counterclockwise circles, and a complete circle represents a complete business cycle.
The chart represents two complete business cycles. Commenting only on the most
recent, high unemployment levels coexisted with incipient positive employment growth
rates at the end of 1994. This situation lasted until the beginning of the 2000s (phase 2
in the above definitions, corresponding to the top-right quarter in the graph). Then,
unemployment started to lie below its average (phase 3, top-left quarter). This expan-
sionary period lasted until the end of 2007, with a decreasing unemployment rate below
the historical average. The recession initiated in 2008 with a marked decrease in employ-
ment, although the unemployment rate was still below the average until the beginning of
2010 (phase 4, bottom-left quarter). Finally, the continuing deterioration in the labor
market brought the unemployment rate above its average until the end of the sample
period (phase 1, bottom-right quarter).
4 Empirical results
Before presenting our estimated results of real wage cyclicality, it is worth presenting
some of the main characterizing features of the wage setting in Spain over the period
1987 to 2013. Firstly, collective agreements cover about 90% of the salaried workforce
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Figure 1 Employment growth vs. unemployment rate in Spain: counterclockwise rotation.
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province-sector level, with a very low share of firm-level agreements. This predomin-
ance of negotiations at an intermediate level of decentralization has been found to
provide a low association of wages and labor conditions to firms’ individual perform-
ance (See, for instance, Bentolila et al. 2010 and Izquierdo et al. 2004). Recent labor
market reforms have indeed tried to increase the decentralization of the collective
bargaining system in Spain, although it is still not possible to assess the impact of these
reforms on wage cyclicality. Moreover, traditionally, the Spanish labor market has been
characterized by a strong wage indexation to inflation, resulting in a high inertia of
wages and real downward wage rigidities (Messina et al. 2010).
Table 2 depicts the estimates of our two-step equation model, showing real wage
semi-elasticity to unemployment variations along the four business cycle phases defined
previously12. The first thing to notice is that, regardless of what phase the economy
is in, real wages are very weakly procyclical in Spain. Our estimates point to an
increase (decrease) of between 0.24-0.48 pp in real wages after a decrease (increase) of
1 pp in the unemployment rate. These estimates are similar to those reported by De la
Roca (2014) for the Spanish case when no differences across the business cycle phases
are allowed, and they are much lower than those found for other countries. For instance,
Pissarides (2009) summarizes the evidence of real wage cyclicality in the US and some
European countries, finding wage to unemployment semi-elasticities being above 1 in
the US case, although with large differences between job-movers and job-stayers.
Results for different European countries also tend to find this semi-elasticity above 1,
especially in the UK (close to 2 according to Devereux and Hart (2006) and Peng and
Siebert (2006)), but also in Germany, Italy or Portugal13.
On top of this low wage sensitivity to business cycle conditions, we also find
significant differences depending on the cyclical phase of the economy. That is, wage
cyclicality in Spain does not exhibit a symmetric pattern along the business cycle, and wages
respond differently depending on what phase of the cycle the economy is operating in.
In particular, looking at the results shown in Table 2, downward wage rigidities seem
to be playing a relevant role in the Spanish labor market, as wage cyclicality is much
lower in recessions than in expansions, and the level of the unemployment rate appears
to be relevant only in expansionary periods. These results are in line to those reported
by Shin and Shin (2008) for the US, although in that case, no distinction was made
according to the level of the unemployment rate.
More specifically, if we analyze how wage cyclicality varies along the four phases
defined in this paper, Column 2 would describe how wages are related to unemployment
variations in a recovery phase, like the situation in Spain in 2014, where employment isTable 2 Real wage cyclicality: 4 scenarios
Recession Expansion Expansion Recesion
Unemp. high Test Unemp. high Test Unemp. low Test Unemp. low Test
(1) 1 = 2 (2) 2 = 3 (3) 3 = 4 (4) 4 = 1
Overall −0.243*** *** −0.383*** *** −0.481*** *** −0.245*** no
(0.038) (0.041) (0.067) (0.065)
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
no: Non-significant.
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situation, wages increase as a response to reductions in the unemployment rate, with a
semi-elasticity of 0.38%. If this situation persists, and the expansionary period leads to
unemployment falling below its average, the economy would enter in the phase defined
by Column 3. In this new phase of higher upward pressure on wages derived from the
lower unemployment rate and an increasing level of employment, wage semi-elasticity to
unemployment rises to 0.48%. This higher wage sensitivity to the unemployment rate is
found to be significantly higher than the one observed under higher unemployment at the
1% confidence level.
Nevertheless, once the expansionary period ends and the economy starts shrinking, a
significantly lower wage reaction to unemployment is found. In particular, a one
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate decreases real wages by 0.25%
(column 4). Thus, wage response is almost half that of the one observed in the previous
expansionary period, this difference being statistically significant at the 1% level. There-
fore, these results would be coherent with the existence of significant downward wage
rigidities in Spain, since wage cyclicality is much lower in recessions than in expan-
sions. Eventually, as the economy continues deteriorating and the unemployment rate
keeps rising, the economy moves into a period that combines a worsening economy
and a high level of unemployment. Nonetheless, as we can see in Column (1), the
semi-elasticity of wages does not experience any variation (remains at -0.25%), and the
increasing level of unemployment fails to induce any additional pressure on wages
adjustment.
In other words, the semi-elasticity of wages to unemployment when the economy is
in recession is low, and it is not found to vary with the unemployment level. When the
economy moves out of the recession, real wages are found to show a greater link to
business cycle conditions, although lower than in other countries. In these expansion-
ary periods, a low level of unemployment rate is associated with additional wage pres-
sures, while this is not the case in recessionary periods. These results indicate the
existence of significant asymmetries in wage formation in Spain, possibly reflecting the
impact of the prevailing labor market institutions, such as the interaction between the
very high duality between permanent and temporary workers and the prevalence of
sectoral levels of negotiations. Overall, this collective bargaining system could be char-
acterized as providing a high level of protection to working conditions of the incum-
bents or insiders in the labor market, while concerns over the access to a job for those
in unemployment are set aside in the bargaining process. As a result, both high levels
of unemployment and wage growth can coexist during the first stages of economic
recovery, therefore delaying the necessary reduction in unemployment.
In order to fully understand these differences in wage cyclicality across the business
cycle and interpret the low wage elasticity observed in Spain with respect to other
countries, we next break down differences in wage response to the business cycle for
different firm-specific tenure categories. To this end, we interact our six tenure categories
with the year-quarter pair dummies in the first stage regression (equation 2 in previous
section) and estimate six separate regression models in the second step (equation 3).
Estimated results are reported in Table 3.
In this table, we observe that differences across the four cyclical phases defined in
this paper are similar across the six tenure categories used. That is, real wage semi-
Table 3 Real wage cyclicality by tenure groups: 4 scenarios
Recession Expansion Expansion Recesion
Unemp. high Test Unemp. high Test Unemp. low Test Unemp. low Test
(1) 1 = 2 (2) 2 = 3 (3) 3 = 4 (4) 4 = 1
New hires (a) −0.416*** *** −0.548*** ** −0.649*** *** −0.408*** no
(0.045) (0.048) (0.079) (0.077)
Test a = b no no no no
Job movers (b) −0.333*** *** −0.484*** no −0.533*** *** −0.315*** no
(0.044) (0.047) (0.076) (0.075)
Test a = c no no no no
Tenure 1–2 (c) −0.350*** *** −0.486*** ** −0.584*** *** −0.282*** no
(0.047) (0.051) (0.083) (0.081)
Test a = d ** no no no
Tenure 2–4 (d) −0.274*** *** −0.456*** *** −0.599*** *** −0.267** no
(0.047) (0.051) (0.083) (0.082)
Test a = e *** ** no no
Tenure 4–6 (e) −0.237*** *** −0.381*** *** −0.533*** *** −0.298*** no
(0.040) (0.043) (0.070) (0.068)
Test a = f *** *** *** **
Tenure 6+ (f) −0.130*** *** −0.253*** *** −0.333*** *** −0.134* no
(0.033) (0.036) (0.058) (0.057)
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
no: Non-significant.
Font et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2015) 4:13 Page 8 of 13elasticity to unemployment is higher when the economy is expanding and presents low
levels of unemployment, regardless of the accumulated experience a worker has within
a firm. Similarly, and during recessions, the real wage exhibits a lower elasticity to the
unemployment rate evolution, and this downward real wage rigidity seems to be
unaffected by the level of unemployment. Again, once the economy initiates its recov-
ery, real wages start increasing again for all tenure categories with a higher sensitivity
to our cycle indicator than they showed during recessions. In any case, it should be
noted that, as in other countries (Pissarides, 2009, Carneiro et al. 2012), wage cyclicality
is found to be higher for newly-hired workers, with point estimates for wage semi-
elasticity ranging from −0.41 (in recessions) to −0.65 in expansionary periods with low
unemployment. By contrast, long-tenure workers are found to show very weak wage
cyclicality, from −0.13 in recessions to a maximum of −0.33 in expansionary periods.
Wage cyclicality estimates are, on a general basis, found to show a monotonic inverse
relationship with tenure in the Spanish labor market.
In Table 3, we also present the significance of these differences across tenure categor-
ies and to what extent there is some variation across the business cycle. In this regard,
differences in wage cyclicality between new-hired, job movers, and low tenure (less
than 2 years) workers tend to be non significant, while long-tenure workers tend to
exhibit a significantly lower wage sensitivity to unemployment. Interestingly, downward
wage rigidities seem to be playing a relevant role protecting wage falls for workers with
a tenure higher than two years in the most adverse cyclical situation (recessions
with high unemployment), while, by contrast, in expansionary periods only long
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unemployment.
Another interesting dimension, although closely related to tenure, is to look at
differences in wage cyclicality in Spain by type of contract. The Spanish labor market is
characterized by a high level of duality, where a large proportion of the salaried
workforce (about 24% in 2014, but above 30% over the expansionary period) is under
fixed-term contracts with a high turnover rate, while the rest holds over in permanent
contracts with high redundancy costs.
Table 4 reflects that wages of workers under fixed-term contracts are more sensitive
to the unemployment rate than those wages of workers subject to permanent contracts.
In fact, in column (1) we observe that wages of workers under fixed-term contracts are
almost two times more responsive to job destruction when the economy is in recession
and unemployment is high than wages of workers with a permanent contract (-0.43
vs -0.21). Once the economy starts recovering, and despite the existence of a high level of
unemployed stock, real wages become more sensitive than they were during the reces-
sion for both contract type workers (Column 2), although the increase in the sensitivity
is found to be higher for permanent workers. Thus, the wage elasticity in this phase of
the cycle is also higher for workers with temporary jobs, but the asymmetry of the real
wage response is higher for workers with a permanent job. Once the unemployment
rate has lowered and the economy continues expanding (column 3), real wages of
permanent workers become even more sensitive to unemployment reductions, while
the increase in wage sensitivity of workers with fixed-term contracts is lower. In the next
phase (column 4), when the economy enters into recession but still enjoys a low level of
unemployed workers, real wages decrease in a less sensitive way for both groups, but
more markedly for those with a permanent contract. Overall, as it can be seen in
Table 4.A, semi-elasticity of wages to the unemployment rate is statistically higher for
those with a temporary contract than for permanent workers, the exception being
expansionary periods with low unemployment, when traditionally highly rigid wages of
permanent workers show a wage sensitivity to cyclical conditions similar to the one
estimated for temporary workers. In other words, asymmetries in wage adjustment
between expansions and recessions are clearly higher in Spain among permanent
workers, who are especially protected from wage cuts in recessions.
Finally, Table 5 depicts wage semi-elasticity by age groups. We observe that wages of
older workers are the most protected from the business cycle in all four phases, whileTable 4 Real wage cyclicality by contract types: 4 scenarios
Recession Expansion Expansion Recesion
Unemp. high Test Unemp. high Test Unemp. low Test Unemp. low Test
(1) 1 = 2 (2) 2 = 3 (3) 3 = 4 (4) 4 = 1
Permanent (a) −0.207*** *** −0.345*** *** −0.466*** *** −0.209** no
(0.041) (0.044) (0.071) (0.070)
Test a = b *** *** no **
Fixed-term (b) −0.431*** *** −0.520*** * −0.587*** *** −0.414*** no
(0.043) (0.046) (0.074) (0.072)
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
no: Non-significant.
Table 5 Real wage cyclicality by age groups: 4 scenarios
Recession Expansion Expansion Recesion
Unemp. high Test Unemp. high Test Unemp. low Test Unemp. low Test
(1) 1 = 2 (2) 2 = 3 (3) 3 = 4 (4) 4 = 1
16-29 (a) −0.306*** *** −0.497*** *** −0.611*** *** −0.318*** no
(0.046) (0.049) (0.080) (0.079)
Test a = b no ** no no
30-45 (b) −0.227*** *** −0.364*** *** −0.469*** *** −0.224*** no
(0.037) (0.040) (0.065) (0.063)
Test a = c *** *** *** *
45+ (c) −0.146*** *** −0.264*** *** −0.353*** *** −0.146* no
(0.035) (0.037) (0.061) (0.060)
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
no: Non-significant.
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unemployment rate. For all age group categories, we observe that wages are more
sensitive to expansions than they are to recessions. Furthermore, a higher
unemployment rate does not statistically affect the path at which real wages adjust
during a recession, while the opposite is true with a lower unemployment rate
when the economy is expanding. This is, in fact, a clear example of downwardly
rigid wages.
All in all, the estimations for different groups suggests a lower wage semi-elasticity
(especially in recessions) for those groups more protected from unemployment
(permanent, older, and high tenured). Regarding firm’s characteristics, the information
available in our database is limited. By firm’s size, no significant differences in wage
cyclicality are found, while by sectors of activity, wages in the construction sector are
found to be additionally downwardly rigid in Spain in recessionary periods, while no
significant differences are found in upturns14.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have carried out an analysis of the wage cyclicality in Spain accounting
for worker heterogeneity. Our results show that real wages are very weakly procyclical,
showing a much lower association with the cyclical conditions in the labor market than
is observed in other European countries. Moreover, wage sensitiveness to unemploy-
ment is not constant along the business cycle. In fact, real wages are found to be more
sensitive to unemployment decreases during expansionary periods, while downward
wage rigidities pose limits to wage adjustments in recessions. Furthermore, the level of
unemployed stock in the economy seems not to affect the path at which real wages
adjust during an economic downturn, but low levels of unemployed individuals lead to
higher procyclicality of real wages in a booming economy.
This general picture remains unchanged when we look at differences between differ-
ent types of workers, in particular, across tenure categories, contract type, and age
groups. We show that wage procyclicality is lower for high tenured individuals, those
with a permanent contract, and older workers, who also present a higher asymmetry in
wage cyclicality between expansions and recessions. As a result, these workers are
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pansionary periods these differences tend to disappear.
All in all, these results point to very low wage cyclicality in Spain with respect to
those usually estimated for the US and other European countries. We also found an
important role of downward wage rigidities limiting wage reductions in recessions.
These results are fully in line with recent developments in the Spanish labor market,
where wage reaction to the strong increase in the unemployment rate was mild, especially
in the first phase of the crisis initiated in 2008. Moreover, it should be noticed that
composition effects exacerbate the weak procyclicality of wages in Spain in recessions
since those groups with lower wage sensitiveness to the cycle, permanent workers and
those with longer tenure, increase their share of total employment in downturns15.
Although identifying the sources of these rigidities is beyond the scope of this paper,
these results would be in line with previous analyses, which have documented the pres-
ence of rigidities in the adjustment of labor costs in Spain16 along with very large employment
volatility17. The Spanish labor market18 is characterized by a high degree of wage
stickiness deriving from the main features of the collective bargaining system, where
automatic extension of sectoral agreements extend their application to all firms and
workers19 and where the dual structure of the Spanish labor market may exacerbate
this wage rigidity (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994). Recent reforms approved since 2010 as
a reaction to the strong deterioration of the labor market have tried to raise wage
bargaining decentralization along with reducing the protection gap between permanent
and temporary contracts. In particular, the prevalence of firm-level agreements was
ensured and the conditions for opting-out clauses from sectoral agreements were eased,
while employment protection for permanent contracts was decreased.
All in all, these recent changes should increase a firm’s possibilities to adjust wages in
the presence of adverse shocks, when, as the results of this paper has shown, downward
wage rigidities additionally limit wage reaction to cyclical developments. This would
contribute to reducing the firm’s need to adjust their labor force. If proved successful,
these measures would tend to increase wage elasticity to unemployment to a level more
similar to those estimated in other European countries and then, hopefully, also
contribute to decreasing the large employment/unemployment volatility which charac-
terizes the Spanish labor market.
Endnotes
1It should be noticed that the rise in real wages is observed in 2008–2009 even when
composition effects in employment are controlled. See Galan and Puente (2014).
2We have monthly information on wages and information on any change in the
activity status of the worker, as the dataset collects information on the initial and
expiry date of every contractual relationship of the worker included in the
sample.
3Wage information coming from registers tends to be found more reliable than
those obtained from household surveys due to large measurement errors and
underreporting of wages in these later datasets.
4Using general CPI as a deflator.
5Around 12% of observations are found to be paid at the maximum level of the
contributory base in our database.
Font et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2015) 4:13 Page 12 of 136Results are robust to different tenure grouping.
7Although workers’ registers start from 1980, our sample begins in 1987 due to the
construction of the group with more than six years of tenure.
8This approach also allows us to keep those individuals that do not work in two con-
secutive periods. A very similar specification is used in De la Roca (2014) and Carneiro
et al. (2012), although in the latter case, the richness of their database allows them to in-
clude worker, job title and firm fixed effects.
9A lagged unemployment rate is normally used in the literature to take into account
that wages are usually not able to respond contemporaneously to cyclical variations:
since wage negotiations last for some time. Results are robust to different unemploy-
ment rate lags.
10There are a total of 108 periods from 1987:1 to 2013:4. Due to the number of
coefficients that need to be estimated and the huge size of the database, results are
based on a 20% random sample of the MCVL. Results are not sensitive to this
threshold, though.
11Results are robust to using year-on-year variations of the unemployment rate.
12The estimation follows equations (2) and (3). A single estimation including all the
four phases is done in both steps.
13See references in Table three in Pissarides (2009).
14Detailed results are available upon request.
15See Table 1.
16And with a high degree of price indexation. See, for instance Druant et al. (2012) for
a comparative analysis with other European countries.
17In Ball et al. (2013), for instance, Spain is found as the country with the highest
Okun’s law coefficient among a large set of developed economies.
18See, for instance, Estrada et al. (2009)
19Independently of their participation in the negotiation. See Bentolila et al. (2010).
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